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7Preface
Vertical coordination and price institutions have a profound impact on the prices at intermedi-
ate and final levels in product chains. These prices determine both the level and the division
of chain profits. This paper analyses the impact of three price institutions on chain prices, out-
put and profits. The game theoretic analysis provides a thorough basis for theoretical
evaluations of price mechanisms. The results also constitute a building stone for empirical es-
timates of behavioural relations and for price determination in empirical microeconomically
founded simulation models.
Frank Bunte and Frank van Tongeren performed the analysis on which this paper is
based. They are grateful to many others for comments and discussion.
The managing director,
Prof. Dr. L.C. Zachariasse
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9Summary
As vertical coordination becomes more important, it is worthwhile to get more insight into the
economic motivations for vertical coordination, the types of coordination pursued and the im-
plications of coordination for economic performance. This paper provides some insight by a
model relating the economic behaviour and performance of actors from all links. The behav-
ioural postulates employed in the model are derived using microeconomic and game theory.
Examples of issues addressed by this model are: what types of coordination are pursued; what
types of coordination are favourable for economic (chain) performance; what implications do
changes in the environment, such as policy changes, have for coordination and performance.
The theoretical framework yields several empirical implications that can be submitted
to econometric tests. The following conclusions are derived analytically:
1. prices set either upstream (primary production) or downstream (retail) fall with the
elasticities of substitution and the number of varieties available;
2. prices set upstream rise with downstream factor costs. A rise in downstream costs
causes a fall in the price elasticity of derived demand;
3. prices set either upstream or downstream rise with the number of varieties per firm.
This result is due to the positive externality a price rise has on the demand of the other
varieties sold by the multiproduct firm;
4. in the symmetric Stackelberg equilibrium with upstream firms as first movers, down-
stream seller concentration does not influence upstream pricing: Upstream prices
depend on the number of varieties per firm upstream, but not on the number of varieties
per firm downstream;
5. the paper shows that vertical coordination between firms leads to a fall in the consumer
price and a rise in output. Aggregate profits also rise if the intersector elasticity of sub-
stitution is sufficiently high;
6. the wholesale price set in the bargaining model depends on the bargaining power of the
upstream firm relative to the bargaining power of the downstream firm. When all bar-
gaining power is upstream, the solution equals the Stackelberg solution. When all
bargaining power is downstream, the wholesale price equals marginal cost, i.e. the fran-
chise solution.
The relations laid down in these conclusions may be used in applied research in the
following two ways. First, the relations derived allow one to make theoretical predictions on
the relation between prices, output and profits on one hand and demand and supply charac-
teristics and price institutions on the other hand. Second, these theoretical relations constitute
a profound basis for empirical applications. In particular, the theoretical analysis yields pre-
cise hypotheses which can be subjected to econometric testing.
Conclusion 2 implies a positive relation between downstream (primary production)
costs and upstream (retail) prices. This information may be used to indicate the implications
of changes in downstream factor costs for both upstream and downstream prices and chain
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output and profits. Empirical tests based on these relations may be used to obtain estimations
of the quantitative impact of changes in downstream factor prices. Conclusion 4 states that -
under certain conditions - downstream seller concentration does not influence upstream pric-
ing. This conclusion has strong implications for the relation between seller concentration and
chain prices, output and profits, and hence bears implications for competition policy. Again,
this conclusion may be tested empirically. Conclusion 5 indicates under what conditions fran-
chising increases chain profits. Whether these conditions are fulfilled for specific agro-food
chains may be investigated using econometric tests. In addition, we obtain rather clear criteria
for the assessment of contract design among vertically related partners in agro-food chains.
The paper may thus be used to give theoretical predictions and as a basis for economet-
ric tests. The price equations derived will be estimated in future research in order to construct
a microsimulation model relating chain prices, output and profits on the one hand to demand
and supply characteristics and coordination and price mechanisms on the other hand.
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1. Introduction
Vertical coordination is of increasing importance in food chains, both in the Netherlands and
abroad. In the US, for instance, vertical coordination rose from 45% to 65% in fresh vegeta-
bles and from 75% to 95% in processed vegetables (Hennessy, 1996). In the Netherlands,
contract production accounted for more than 80% of total production for vegetables like string
beans, green peas, spinach and carrots (Van Scheppingen, 1985). The contracts between the
food processing industry and cultivators are very detailed: They contain stipulations on the
seed-date, the amount of seed, seed-race, the harvest-date, cutting, threshing, loading, trans-
port, et cetera. Recently, retail trade also becomes more involved in vertical contracting, both
with the food processing industry and cultivators. This trend is attended with marketing con-
cepts such as Efficient Consumer Response and Category Management and logistic systems
such as Just-In-Time Delivery and Electronic Data Interchange.
Since vertical coordination becomes more important, it is worthwhile to get more in-
sight in the economic motivations for vertical coordination, the types of coordination pursued
and the implications of coordination for economic performance. This paper provides some in-
sight by a model relating the economic behaviour and performance of actors from all links.
The behavioural postulates employed in the model are derived using microeconomic theory.
Examples of issues addressed by this model are: what types of coordination are pursued; what
types of coordination are favourable for economic (chain) performance; what implications do
changes in the environment, such as policy changes, have for coordination and performance.
Individual firms are taken as starting point for the analysis. However, since our ultimate inter-
est refers to the product chain level, the aggregation in links and the coordination between
links receive thorough attention.
The paper delivers a conceptual framework and a game theoretic analysis of various
price setting regimes. The specification of the model is chosen in such a way that it can be
implemented empirically in a numerical simulation model.
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 addresses the double marginalisation
problem briefly. The double marginalisation argument is one of the key theoretical insights of
the Industrial Organisation literature on vertical coordination. Since double marginalisation
refers to price behaviour, this insight will be elaborated in this chapter. In chapter 3 consumer
demand and producer factor demand and costs will be derived. Chapter 2 and 3 provide the
tools for analysing price behaviour. This will be done in chapter 4. Section 4.2 analyses price
decisions under non-cooperation; section 4.3 those under cooperation (franchising). In these
two sections, we distinguish single product firms only. In section 4.4 we complicate the
analysis somewhat by analysing the price decisions of multiproduct firms. In section 4.2-4.4,
upstream firms set wholesale prices just like downstream firms set consumer prices. In section
4.5, however, wholesale prices are determined as the outcome of a bargaining process be-
tween upstream and downstream firms.
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2. Theoretical background
2.1 Introduction
New Industrial Organisation theory (Tirole 1988) considers externalities between vertically
related firms as the prime ground for vertical coordination. Externalities cause a divergence
between joint profits under vertical integration and under non-cooperation. Joint profits may
be raised by internalising the externalities through vertical coordination. Four major externa l-
ities are identified:
1. double marginalisation
A price rise in one link of the chain reduces the output of other links as well (Spengler
1950). Under non-cooperation the resulting loss of gross profits suffered by the other
links is not taken into account in the pricing decisions. As a result, the price rise is too
large from the chain's point of view;
2. input substitution
When an upstream firm charges a monopoly price, his1 product will be substituted for
another product downstream. As a result, his output is contracted. The upstream firm
may prevent input substitution and profit erosion by vertical coordination;
3. moral hazard
Promotional activities do not only raise output in one link, but also in other links. These
activities are again too low from the chain's perspective, when the positive externality is
not taken into account. Moral hazard comes in when e.g. manufacturers can not monitor
retailer promotion efforts and thus can not prescribe the level of activities;
4. free riding behaviour
Free riding occurs when a company's service and quality efforts favour rival firms as
well (Telser 1960). Rival demand is boosted by the positive externalities while rival
costs are lower. This enables rival firms to set more competitive prices and drive the
company performing service and quality efforts out of the market. As a result, the serv-
ice and quality levels are too low, not only from the link's point of view, but also from
the chains perspective.
There are two additional aspects which play a crucial role in concluding vertical coordi-
nation contracts: uncertainty and strategic interactions.
5. uncertainty
Under uncertainty, risk aversion and insurance play a decisive role on the vertical ar-
rangement to be concluded. Risk averse companies are willing to accept lower margins
if income volatility is reduced;
                                                
1 In this study, the upstream firm is referred to with the pronouns 'he' and 'his'; the downstream firm with the pro-
nouns 'she' and 'her'.
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6. strategic considerations
Firms may foreclose entry by vertical coordination in order to raise market power. This
issue is still highly debated in Industrial Organisation and offers a fruitful area for future
research. This area has large antitrust implications.
The model outlined in this study concentrates on the double-marginalisation problem.
The double marginalisation problem is closely related to the price decisions in vertical rela-
tions and for this reason put at the heart of the analysis of this study. Since input substitution
refers to price analysis as well, it will be relatively simple to incorporate input substitution in
future research. The moral hazard and free-riding problems related to service and quality ef-
forts are not addressed here. The incorporation of uncertainty, risk aversion and strategic
considerations are intricate complications left for future research.
2.2 Double marginalisation
The double marginalisation argument can be best illustrated using a simple two-links-chain
model (figure 2.1). In this chain, the product flows from the suppliers of raw materials via the
upstream and the downstream firms to the consumers. The upstream firms pay Pvu per prod-
uct, the downstream firms Pvd and the consumers Pvc.1 All upstream and downstream firms
sell different varieties: Products are heterogeneous. This implies that each firm has a 'local'
monopoly: Demand is downward-sloping.
Figure 2.1 The chain
                                                
1 P denotes price, while subscript v refers to a particular variety. Superscripts u, d, and c refer to the paying actor:
the upstream firm, the downstream firm and the consumer respectively.
Consumer
Pv
c
Pp
u
Pp
d
Pv
d
Raw materials
Factor
inputs
Downstream
Pv
u
Upstream
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Double marginalisation (Spengler 1950) occurs when both firms charge a price above
marginal cost. When the downstream firm raises her price above marginal cost, both her own
and the upstream firm's output is reduced. The downstream firm's price rise hurts the up-
stream firm's sales (and vice versa). However, since this effect does not affect the non-
cooperative downstream firm herself, the latter does not take this external effect into account.
As a result, the downstream firm raises the consumer price rise too much, since the joint cost
of the price rise - the margin lost by both the upstream and the downstream firm due to the
output reduction - is higher than the downstream firm's own cost - the margin lost by the
downstream firm. The downstream firm's gain is the margin increase due to the price rise.
Vertical coordination internalises the upstream firm's cost and leads to a price drop and
an increase in output. As a result consumers benefit as well. Vertical coordination is not nec-
essarily as detrimental as horizontal coordination. 1 Note that when one of the two links is
competitive, the problem does not arise, since the margin lost on the output reduction van-
ishes for the competitive link: There is no external effect. Vertical coordination may be
obtained through a franchise-fee-system, resale price maintenance, quantity fixing or even
vertical integration.
In a franchise-fee-system the upstream firm charges a wholesale price as well as a fran-
chise fee which is fixed, i.e. non-related to the output sold. The downstream firm now
maximises joint profits, since its marginal cost, Pvd, equals the chain's marginal cost, Pvu. The
only problem the upstream firm now faces is the fact that the downstream firm earns all prof-
its. However, the franchise fee enables him to capture (a part of) the downstream firm's
profits. The division of profits depends on the firms' bargaining power.
Resale price maintenance also enables the upstream firm to capture monopoly profits.
He merely sets the consumer price at the joint optimum level and leaves the downstream firm
a margin equal to downstream marginal factor costs. However, resale price maintenance is
per se illegal in both the US and the EU. The upstream firm may also force the downstream
firm to sell the optimum quantity (at the optimum price) through quantity forcing. Shelf ar-
rangements and minimum purchase requirements are equivalent to quantity forcing. Vertical
integration is, of course, also a solution to the double marginalisation problem, provided it
solves the agency problem internally.
Abiru (1988) shows that the above argument also applies to oligopolistic market struc-
tures. The consumer price falls in the so-called pure case of vertical integration. 2 In Abiru,
there is Cournot competition in the upstream as well as the downstream market. However, the
consumer price may not fall when vertical integration is attended with horizontal concentra-
tion. This may occur when the number of upstream firms is not equal to the number of
downstream firms, more in particular when the former number is smaller than the latter.
                                                
1 This result explains the Chicago School's hypothesis that a firm with monopoly power in one link cannot extend
this power by vertical integration into competitive links. If monopoly power cannot be enhanced and efficiency
may be increased by vertical integration, there is no need for competition policy against vertical arrangments
(Scherer and Ross 1990).
2 In the pure case, the number of upstream oligopolists equals the number of downstream oligopolists.
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3. The model
3.1 Introduction
The behavioural postulates employed in this study are derived using microeconomic theory.
Consumer demand is derived from a utility function and subjected to a budget constraint. As a
result, the system of demand equations derived below satisfies both the preferences laid down
in the utility function and the budget restriction in a consistent way. Factor demand and costs
are derived from cost minimisation subject to a production constraint. The system of factor
demand equations found in this way minimises producer costs and corresponds with the un-
derlying relation between factor inputs and production.
3.2 Consumer demand
The utility function employed in this study has a CES-CES nature and reads as follows
))X ( + X ( = U
/1/
v
N
1=vj
J
1j=
atata SS (1)
where a and t are parameters reflecting consumer utility (0 < a < t < 1). Utility depends on
the consumption of two types of products: heterogeneous varieties of food Xv and non-food
products Xj. Total food consumption is represented by Xi = (S Xvt)1/t. Xi equals both the
quantity index for food and the subutility function for food. There are N food varieties and J
non-food products. The elasticity of substitution between any combination of two varieties
s: s = 1/(1-t) is constant and identical which is characteristic of the CES (Constant Elasticity
of Substitution) function. Likewise, the elasticity of substitution between any combination of
two products V: V = 1/(1-a) is constant and identical. Both the subutility function for food and
the aggregate utility function exhibit 'love-of-variety': Consumers prefer to divide their con-
sumption over as many food varieties and as many products as possible (at given prices). The
elasticity of substitution between the food varieties s - the intrasector elasticity - is larger than
the elasticty of substitution between food and other commodities V - the intersector elasticity -
since by assumption a < t. The latter assumption is plausible since one may expect two va-
rieties of the same product - Gouda cheese and Brie - to be closer substitutes than two
products - flowers and potatoes (or televisions).
Consumer demand is derived by maximising utility with respect to all products subject
to the budget constraint. The maximisation problem is the following
I = XP  + XP  .t.s   ))X ( + X ( = Lmax vcvN 1=vjjJ 1j=
/1/
v
N
1=vj
J
1j= SSSS
atata (2)
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where Pj is the consumer price of product j, Pvc is the consumer price of variety v and I is the
overall budget. Demand for each variety v can be shown to be (Appendix)
P)P()P(
I
 = X -1-c
i
c
v
v VsVs
(3)
where Pic is the price index of the food varieties defined by
( ))P(  = P -1cvN 1=v )-/(11ci s sS (4)
and P is the overall consumer price index defined by
( ))P( + )P(  = P -1ci-1cjJ 1j= )-/(11VV VS (5)
3.3 Factor demand and producer costs
Producer behaviour with respect to factor demand depends on the relation between factor in-
puts and production. This relation is referred to as the production function. Producer
behaviour with respect to factor demand is derived from cost minimisation. The production
function employed in this study is of the Leontief-CES-type. We identify two types of inputs:
intermediate input Qv and primary factors input Qp. The latter is decomposed into capital in-
put Qc, labour input Qh and land input Ql. Production is modelled as follows
)Q,Qmin( = X pvv (6)
QQ *vv = (7)
( ))QA( + )QA( + )QA( = Q -ll-hh-cc /-1p rrr r (8)
where Ac, Ah and Al and r are parameters and Qv* represents a certain level of food input. The
elasticity of substitution between any combination of two primary production factors (-
1/(r+1)) is constant which is, again, characteristic of the CES function. The Leontief-nature
of the production function reflects the idea that the supply of food requires a minimum of both
intermediate inputs and primary factor inputs. Within the set of primary factors some substi-
tution is possible. The latter is reflected in Qp, the CES part of the production function.
Cost minimisation is a necessary condition for profit maximisation. Factor demand is
derived on basis of cost minimisation. Given production level Xv*, costs are minimised when
material inputs equal Qv = Xv* and primary factor inputs Qp = Xv*. The only decision left for
the producer is the choice of primary factor inputs minimising costs while meeting the con-
straint Qp = Qp* = Xv*. This problem may be modelled as follows:
Q = Q .t.s   QP + QP + QP = Cmin 
*
ppllhhccp (9)
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where Cp denotes production factor costs, Pc the price of capital, Ph the price of labour (wage)
and Pl the price of land (rent). Taking first order derivatives with respect to Qc, Qh and Ql and
the production constraint gives the following demand for factor inputs
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
A/P
P
X = QA
jj
p
)+/(11
vjj
r
(10)
where j 0 {c,h,l} and Pp is the price index for the primary production factors defined by
( ))A/P(  = P )+/(1jj3 1j= /)+(1p rr rrS (11)
Substituting the demand for primary factors into the cost function gives the reduced cost
equation
X)P+P( = C vvp (12)
where C denotes total costs. This cost function exhibits constant returns to scale: costs are a
linear function of output. This characteristic follows from the choices made with respect to the
production function.1 Constant returns to scale facilitate price analysis enormously (chap-
ter 4). We could, of course, have postulated constant returns to scale straight away, as is quite
common in the literature on Industrial Organisation. However, since the cost function is ex-
plicitly based on a production structure, one may relate chain and firm performance to factor
performance in a later stage.
                                                
1 Increasing and decreasing returns to scale may be modelled by incorporating a constant in the CES function:
Qp = (A0 + S (AjQj)-r)-1/r.
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4. Price decisions
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, pricing behaviour is analysed for four different regimes. Section 4.2 derives
price decisions under non-cooperation; section 4.3 those under cooperation (franchising). In
these sections, we distinguish single product firms only. In section 4.4, we complicate the
analysis somewhat by analysing the price decisions of multiproduct firms. In the previous
three sections, upstream firms set wholesale prices just like downstream firms set consumer
prices. In section 4.5, however, wholesale prices are determined as the outcome of a bargain-
ing process between upstream and downstream firms.
In the first three regimes, price setting is possible since firms have some monopoly
power due to product heterogeneity. Consider figure 2.1 once again. Upstream firms set Pvd,
the varieties' prices to be paid by downstream firms. The prices of raw materials, Pvu, and the
prices of primary factors, Ppu, are taken as given by the upstream firms. Downstream demand,
however, is not taken as given. Downstream demand depends on consumer demand which in
turn is a function of downstream marginal costs a part of which is made up of the varieties'
prices set upstream, Pvd. Downstream firms set Pvc, the varieties' prices to be paid by consum-
ers. The varieties' prices charged by the upstream firms, Pvd, and the prices of primary factor
inputs, Ppd, are taken as given. Consumer demand is given for downstream firms. Hence,
firms exhibit price taking behaviour on their input markets and price setting behaviour on
their output markets. In the fourth regime, however, upstream firms do not set prices, but bar-
gain over wholesale prices with downstream firms.
In all four regimes, the model is analysed as a two-stage game. Wholesale prices are
determined before consumer prices are. The model is solved backwardly by first deriving op-
timal downstream prices as a function of upstream prices. The reason for this order is the
following. The downstream firms take all input prices and consumer demand as given. The
upstream firms, however, know that they may influence downstream price decisions by their
own price decisions. (This also holds for both upstream and downstream firms in the bar-
gaining-regime.) By analysing downstream equilibrium first, this influence is taken into
account. In the second step, optimal upstream prices are derived, which are thus based, among
other things, on the relation between upstream prices and downstream equilibrium prices. The
game-theoretic structure makes the upstream firms Stackelberg leaders and the downstream
firms Stackelberg followers, when prices are decided upon non-cooperatively.
The price solutions derived below constitute subgame perfect Nash equilibria. A price
solution constitutes a Nash equilibrium, if every firm's price is the best possible reaction to the
prices set by all other firms. Since the price solution meets the main conditions for profit
maximisation - the first order conditions - for all firms, the solution is a Nash equilibrium. The
solution is subgame perfect since the price solution is a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
Downstream prices constitute a Nash equilibrium of the downstream price game, the subgame
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of the overall game. Upstream prices constitute a Nash equilibrium, since the upstream firms
take account of each others' price reactions and downstream equilibrium.
4.2 Non-cooperative price decisions
In this section, non-cooperative price decisions are analysed. The price decisions are non-
cooperative, since both upstream and downstream firms maximise individual rather than joint
profits. Upstream and downstream firms set wholesale and consumer prices respectively and
do not use coordination devices such as franchise-fee-systems. In order to keep the argument
simple for the moment, we assume that there are N one-product firms in both links. Each up-
stream firm sells its product to one downstream firm. This implies that all downstream firms
buy from one upstream firm. The complications brought about by the multiproduct nature of
firms is dealt with in section 4.4.
All N downstream firms maximise the following profit equation
)P c(X)P-P-P( = )P(max vdpdvcvcvdvP (13)
where again Pvc is the consumer price of variety v, Pvd is its wholesale price set by the up-
stream firm and Ppd is the factor input price (figure 1). Xv is consumer demand which depends
on Pc, the price vector of all consumer prices: Pc = [Pv1, ..., PvN]. Equating marginal revenues
and marginal costs gives (Appendix)1
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where inc* = (P/Pic)V-1 represents the equilibrium propensity to consume. The consumer price
depends on downstream marginal cost (Pvd + Ppd) multiplied by a mark-up factor. One may
show that the consumer price depends negatively on the elasticities of substitution
s: ¶Pvc/¶s < 0 and V: ¶Pvc/¶V < 0, and on the number of varieties N: ¶Pvc/¶N < 0.These find-
ings are intuitively plausible. When the elasticity of substitution and thus the price elasticity of
demand increase, the opportunity cost of a price increase - a fall in demand - rises. As a result,
the mark-up over marginal costs falls. The elasticity of demand also rises with the number of
varieties available. Again, the mark-up falls. On the other hand, price is positively related to
the propensity to consume food: ¶Pvc/¶i > 0. The propensity to consume food rises when the
ratio between the overall price index and the food price index increases.
All N upstream firms maximise the following profit equation
)P(X)P-P-P( = )P(max cvupuvdvdvuvP (15)
                                                
1 In this chapter, downstream and upstream firms are treated symmetrically, i.e. they are identical. The solutions
presented in this chapter hereby provide a benchmark for various types of asymmetries introduced in a later stage.
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where Pvd is the price of variety v set by upstream firm v, Pvu is the wholesale price paid by
the upstream firm and Ppu its factor input price (figure 2.1). Xv represents consumer demand
which depends on Pc, the vector of all consumer prices, and indirectly on the wholesale price
the upstream firm sets, Pvd. The upstream firms take downstream equilibrium into account via
the demand term: Xv(Pc). Equating marginal revenues and marginal costs gives (Appendix)
[ ]
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The wholesale price depends on two terms. The first term is analogous to the one found
above: the upstream firm's marginal cost multiplied by a mark-up factor. The second term in-
dicates the influence of the downstream price decision on the upstream price decision. The
price set by the upstream firm rises with factor costs downstream. This finding is due to the
following mechanism. A rise in primary factor costs downstream causes an increase in the
consumer price. As a result, the elasticity of downstream demand as perceived upstream in-
creases. This causes the upstream firm to charge an extra mark-up. Again, the price set
corresponds negatively with both the elasticities of substitution s : ¶Pvd/¶s < 0 and
V: ¶Pvd/¶V < 0, and the number of varieties N: ¶Pvd/¶N < 0. The price set is again positively
related to the propensity to consume food: ¶Pvd/¶i > 0. The same arguments as above apply.
Now both upstream and downstream prices are derived, we may summarise our find-
ings. The wholesale price Pvd may be used to rewrite the consumer price Pvc. When one
substitutes for Pvd, the following consumer price is found
)P+P+P( = P dpupuv2cv n (17)
where n = [((s-1)(N-1)+(V-1)(1- inc*)+N)/((s-1)(N-1)+(V-1)(1-inc*))]. Consumer demand
equals
N)P+P+P(
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Downstream profits per variety are
N
I)-(
 = 
2
*
nc
2
d
v
n
inn
P (19)
Upstream profits per variety are
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Aggregate profits per variety are
N
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The prices set, the quantities sold and the profits received are all endogenous to our
model. We summarised the endogenous variables in order to compare the results under non-
cooperation with those obtained under cooperation, in particular franchising (section 4.3).
4.3 Franchising as coordination device
In section 2.2, we argued that the double marginalisation problem arising under non-
cooperation may be solved by franchising. Under franchising the upstream firm sells at mar-
ginal cost. As a result, it does not earn any net profits, but receives a franchise fee in return.
The franchise fee depends on its bargaining power relative to the downstream firm. Recall
that a franchise fee system maximises aggregate net profits, since the downstream firm is the
only residual claimant. The downstream firm maximises aggregate profits, since her marginal
costs coincide with the chain's marginal costs. Her marginal costs do not include the mark-up
set by the upstream firm under non-cooperation (section 4.2).
The wholesale price Pvd under franchising equals the upstream firm's marginal costs
P+P = P upuvdv (22)
The downstream price is again given by equation (14). The downstream firms' price de-
cisions are not affected by the franchise fee system, since this is a lump sum transfer. The
consumer price may be derived by substituting equation (22) into equation (14). The con-
sumer price equals
)P+P+P( = P dpupuvcv n (23)
The consumer price under franchising is smaller than under non-cooperation, because
n2 > n > 1. Output now equals
N)P+P+P(
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Output under franchising exceeds output under non-cooperation because n2 > n > 1 and
if* > inc* since ¶i/¶Pvc < 0. Aggregate profits per variety now are
N
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Aggregate profits are divided as follows. Upstream profits equal the franchise fee F
paid by the downstream firm: Õvu = F. Downstream profits equal aggregate profits minus the
franchise fee: Õvd = Õv-F. Aggregate profits under franchising exceed those under non-
cooperation if
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Since this condition can not be simplified analytically, (if*/inc*) and n are approximated
by taking limits. The approximation of (if/inc) is valid when the chain is a small part of the
economy (J®¥ in Eq. (5)). The approximation of n is valid when both links are competitive
(N®¥). When we use the fact that lim N®¥ n(if*) » lim N®¥ n(inc*) » s/(s-1) and
lim J®¥ (if*/inc*) » nV-1 » (s/(s-1))V-1, the above inequality may be reduced to
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Franchising raises aggregate profits, if the intersector elasticity of substitution V is high,
i.e. close to s. When the intersector elasticity of substitution is high, food expenditures rise
when the food price index falls.
There are other mechanisms than the franchise fee system which attain the cooperative
outcome, notably resale price maintenance (RPM). Since these mechanisms are equivalent in
the simple framework set-out so far, we ignore these mechanisms for the moment. The price
mechanisms are no longer equivalent when complications such as uncertainty and asymmetric
information are allowed for.
4.4 Multiproduct firms
This section complicates the above analysis by allowing firms to have more than one product.
In particular, we allow the upstream firms to sell m varieties each and the downstream firms
to sell n varieties each. Since there are N varieties, there are (N/m) upstream firms and (N/n)
downstream firms. Because the subject of our study, vertical contracts, refers to specific firms
and specific products, we assume that each upstream firm sells each of his m varieties to one
firm; however, he may sell more than one variety to the same firm. For the same reason, we
assume that each downstream firm buys each of her n varieties from one firm, although she
may buy more than one variety from the same firm. This assumption is particularly suited for
analysing the effects of vertical coordination on aggregated profits per variety. However, it
does not allow the possibility that one variety is sold to or bought from more than one firm. In
the first part of this section, we analyse non-cooperative behaviour; in the second part, we
deal with franchising.
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4.4.1 Non-cooperative price decisions
Multiproduct downstream firms maximise
)Pc(X)P-P-P(  = )P,...,P(max vdpdvcvn 1=vcnc1d SP (28)
over n varieties. As before, Pvc is the consumer price of variety v, Pvd the wholesale price and
Ppd the factor input price; Xv represents consumer demand (figure 2.1). Equating marginal
revenues and marginal costs gives
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The consumer price for the n-product downstream firm is similar to the consumer price
for the one-product downstream firm (equation (14)). The latter is a special case of the n
product case (n = 1). The consumer price depends on downstream marginal cost (Pvd + Ppd)
multiplied by a mark-up factor. One may show that the consumer price depends negatively on
the elasticities of substitution s: ¶Pvc/¶s < 0 and V: ¶Pvc/¶V < 0, and on the number of varieties
N: ¶Pvc/¶N < 0. The argument is the same as above. On the other hand, price is positively re-
lated to the number of varieties per firm n: ¶Pvc/¶n > 0. When single product firms decide on
price, they weight an increase in a variety's price-cost margin against its decrease in demand.
Multiproduct firms also take the demand externality into account with respect to the other
products sold. A rise in variety 1's price coincides with an increase in demand for varieties 2
to n. This dampens the opportunity cost of a rise in variety 1's price, the fall in variety 1's de-
mand. As a result, prices are higher, the higher the number of varieties per firm is. Price is
also positively related to the propensity to consume food: ¶Pvc/¶i < 0. The propensity to con-
sume food rises when the ratio between the overall price index and the food price index
increases.
Multiproduct upstream firms maximise
)Pc(X)P-P-P(  = )P,...,P(max vupuvdvm 1=vdmd1u SP (30)
over m varieties. Pvd is the wholesale price of variety v as set by the upstream firm, Pvu the
wholesale price as paid by the upstream firm and Ppu the factor input price; Xv represents con-
sumer demand (figure 2.1). The upstream firms take downstream equilibrium into account via
the demand term: Xv(Pc). Equating marginal revenues and costs gives the following price so-
lution
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The consumer price for the m product upstream firm is similar to the consumer price for
the single product upstream firm. The latter is a special case of the m product case (m = 1).
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The consumer price equals upstream marginal cost (Pvu + Ppu) times a mark-up factor. Again,
the wholesale price corresponds negatively with both the elasticities of substitution
s: ¶Pvd/¶s < 0 and V: ¶Pvd/¶V < 0, and the number of varieties N: ¶Pvd/¶N < 0. The wholesale
price is also positively related to the number of varieties per firm m: ¶Pvd/¶m > 0, and the
propensity to consume i: ¶Pvd/¶i < 0. The arguments are the same as the ones used for the
consumer price.
We now present the reduced form equations for the consumer price, output and profits.
We do so briefly, since the results are similar to the results of section 4.2. The consumer price
equals
)P+P+P( = P dpupuvcv mn (32)
where m = [((s-1)(N-m)+m(V-1)(1-i)+N)/((s-1)(N-m)+m(V-1)(1-i))] and n = [((s-1)(N-
n)+n(V-1)(1-i)+N)/((s-1)(N-n)+n(V-1)(1- i))]. Output is
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Downstream profits per variety are
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Upstream profits per variety are
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Aggregate profits per variety are
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These results refer to non-cooperation.
4.4.2 Franchising as coordination device
Under franchising, the following results are obtained. The wholesale price is
P+P = P upuvdv (37)
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The downstream price is again given by equation (29). The consumer price equals
)P+P+P( = P dpupuvcv n (38)
The consumer price under franchising is smaller than under non-cooperation since
m > 1. Output now equals
N)P+P+P(
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Output under franchising exceeds output under non-cooperation because m > 1 and
¶i/¶Pvc < 0. Aggregate profits per variety now are
N
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inP (40)
Aggregate profits are divided as follows. Upstream profits equal the franchise fee F
paid by the downstream firm: Õvu = F. Downstream profits equal aggregate profits minus the
franchise fee: Õvd = Õv-F. Aggregate profits under franchising exceed those under non-
cooperation if
( )
)()(
1-)()(
 > 
)(
1)-)((
*
nc
*
nc
*
nc
*
nc
*
nc
*
f
*
f
*
f
inim
iinim
in
iin (41)
Since this condition can not be simplified analytically, (if*/inc*), m and n are approxi-
mated by taking limits. Using the same approximations as in section 4.3, the above inequality
may be reduced to
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Again, franchising raises aggregate profits, if the intersector elasticity of substitution V
is high, i.e. close to s. When the intersector elasticity of substitution is high, food expendi-
tures rise when the food price index falls.
In principle, other approximations are also possible. The situation in which one or both
links are monopolised may be studied as well. 1 This implies that at least three alternative con-
ditions may be derived. (1) The situation in which the downstream link is monopolised and
the upstream link is competitive. (2) The situation in which the upstream link is monopolised
                                                
1 When the downstream link is monopolised (N = n), n reduces to n = ((V-1)(1-i)+1)/((V-1)(1-i))). When the up-
stream link is monopolised (N = m), m also reduces to m = ((V-1)(1-i)+1)/((V-1)(1-i))).
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and the downstream link is competitive. (3) The situation in which both links are monopo-
lised. The reader may use footnote 7 to derive similar conditions as equation (42).
4.5 Bargaining
In the above analysis, the upstream firms are able to act as Stackelberg leaders. This ability is
due to the order in which the products flow through the chain in combination with the princ i-
ples of subgame perfection and backwards induction. The ability to act as Stackelberg leaders
gives the upstream firms 'bargaining power' over the downstream firms. With respect to the
relation between food processing and retail industries, the Stackelberg assumption is often
valid. There is substantial bargaining power with food processing companies, especially those
selling A-brands. However, with respect to the relation between farmers on one hand and ei-
ther the food processing or the retail industry on the other hand, this assumption is no longer
valid. Market power lies downstream with food processing companies or horizontal retail
chains. For this reason, the model outlined above is adapted slightly.
As before, the downstream firms set prices after the wholesale prices have been deter-
mined (figure 1). The wholesale prices are determined as a solution to a bargaining process
between the upstream and the downstream firms. The bargaining solution depends on relative
bargaining power. The upstream firms no longer set prices unilaterally, as they did in the pre-
vious sections, unless all bargaining power is upstream.
Downstream prices are determined as before, since they are set after the wholesale
prices have been determined. Consumer prices thus are given by Eq. (14). The wholesale
price is derived as an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (Gravelle and Rees 1992). The
bargaining process may be modelled by the following maximisation problem
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where 0 < f < 1. The upstream and downstream firm maximise the product of downstream
and upstream profits weighted by relative bargaining power. The downstream firm's bargain-
ing power is given by f; the upstream firm's bargaining power by 1-f. Maximising the above
function with respect to the wholesale price Pvd gives the following solution after some sub-
stitution
[ ]
 
)-1)(1-(m+1)-)(m(N-
PN)-(1N)-(1+)-1)(1-m(+1)-)(m(N-)P+P(
 = P *
b
d
p
*
b
u
p
u
vd
v ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ +
iVs
ffiVs
(44)
The bargaining solution is a more general solution than the solution presented by Eq.
(16). The latter equation accords with the case where all bargaining power is with the up-
stream firm (f = 0). The other extreme solution has also been derived above. When all
bargaining power is with the downstream firm (f = 1), the upstream firm is forced to sell at
marginal cost. The latter situation probably reflects the actual relation between farmers and
their contracting parties in either the food processing or the retail industry quite well. The
wholesale price is forced down to marginal cost.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this paper a theoretical framework has been outlined which has a number of empirical im-
plications that can be submitted to econometric tests. Consumer demand and producer factor
demand, costs and prices are all based on microeconomic behavioural postulates. Moreover,
consumer demand is modelled with a utility function exhibiting 'love of variety', i.e. the desire
for product differentiation. The model offers a framework for analysing firm, industry, chain
and factor performance, since both input and output prices and quantities are accounted for
and even determined endogenously (except for the prices of raw materials). The following
conclusions are derived analytically:
1. prices set either upstream or downstream fall with the elasticities of substitution and the
number of varieties available;
2. prices set upstream rise with downstream factor costs. A rise in downstream factor costs
causes a fall in the price elasticity of derived demand;
3. prices set either upstream or downstream rise with the number of varieties per firm.
This result is due to the positive externality a price rise has on the demand of the other
varieties sold by the multiproduct firm;
4. in the symmetric Stackelberg equilibrium with upstream firms as first movers, down-
stream seller concentration does not influence upstream pricing: Upstream prices
depend on the number of varieties per firm upstream, but not on the number of varieties
per firm downstream;
5. the paper shows that vertical coordination between firms leads to a fall in the consumer
price and a rise in output. Aggregate profits also rise if the intersector elasticity of sub-
stitution is sufficiently high;
6. the wholesale price set in the bargaining model depends on the bargaining power of the
upstream firm relative to the bargaining power of the downstream firm. When all bar-
gaining power is upstream, the solution equals the Stackelberg solution. When all
bargaining power is downstream, the wholesale price equals marginal cost, i.e. the fran-
chise solution.
An extension of the current model to more than two links does not invoke major prob-
lems, as long as the other assumptions are uphold. More involved extensions include the
derivation of long run equilibria which enable one to determine the equilibrium number of
firms and varieties endogenously; the introduction of asymmetries between firms; empirical
tests of the hypotheses derived above; and the construction of a microsimulation model.
The model describes the Dutch vegetables chain very well. The vegetable processing
industry indeed 'bargains' with cultivators over the wholesale price. The industry uses its bar-
gaining power to enforce marginal cost pricing. On the other hand, the industry provides
cutting, treshing, loading and transport services to the contracted cultivators upstream. If the
services would not be provided, fixed outlays would be necessary upstream. This would in-
hibit marginal cost pricing for the wholesale price. The services are equivalent to a franchise
fee payment from the vegetables processing industry to the cultivators.
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5. Conclusion
In the previous chapter, several theoretical relations have been derived which are summarized
in its conclusion. These relations may be used in applied research in the following two ways.
First, the relations derived allow one to make theoretical predictions on the relation between
prices, output and profits on one hand and demand and supply characteristics and price insti-
tutions on the other hand. Second, these theoretical relations constitute a profound basis for
empirical applications. In particular, the theoretical analysis yields precise hypotheses which
can be subjected to econometric testing.
Conclusion 2 of section 4.6 implies a positive relation between downstream (primary
production) costs and upstream (retail) prices. This information may be used to indicate the
implications of changes in downstream factor costs for both upstream and downstream prices
and chain output and profits. Empirical tests based on these relations may be used to obtain
estimations of the quantitative impact of changes in downstream factor prices. Conclusion 4
states that - under certain conditions - downstream seller concentration does not influence up-
stream pricing. This conclusion has strong implications for the relation between seller
concentration and chain prices, output and profits, and hence bears implications for competi-
tion policy. Again, this conclusion may be tested empirically. Conclusion 5 indicates under
what conditions franchising increases chain profits. Whether these conditions are fulfilled for
specific agro-food chains may be investigated using econometric tests. In addition, we obtain
rather clear criteria for the assessment of contract design among vertically related partners in
agro-food chains.
The paper may thus be used to give theoretical predictions and as a basis for economet-
ric tests. The price equations derived will be estimated in future research in order to construct
a microsimulation model relating chain prices, output and profits on the one hand to demand
and supply characteristics and coordination and price mechanisms on the other hand.
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Appendix
Consumer demand
Utility is given by
))X ( + X ( = U
/1/
v
N
1=vj
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atata SS (1)
where 0 < a < t < 1. Since the above utility function is (weakly) separable, a two-stage
maximisation procedure may be adopted. First, the demand Xv for each variety v is derived
given the expenditure on all the varieties of the commodity under consideration. Second, the
demand for the commodity under consideration, the bundle of v=s, is determined. The first
maximisation problem is the following
I) - XP ( - )X ( = Lmax vcvN 1=v
/1
v
N
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where Pvc is the consumer price of variety v and I income spent on the varieties under consid-
eration. The first part of the Lagrangean function L is the sub-utility function V. The second
part is the budget constraint. The first order derivatives towards Xv and l are
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where s = 1/(1-t) is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. Demand Xv for
may be derived by solving for Xv using equation (3); substituting Xv into equation (4); solving
for l using equation (4) and substituting l into equation (3). This gives
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where Pic is the price index corresponding to V and defined by
( ))P(  = P -1cvN 1=v )-/(11ci s sS (6)
Now the demand for each variety v has been determined given the expenditure on all
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v=s, we may now turn to the demand decision with respect to the bundle of v=s. For this rea-
son, the analysis is repeated using Pic as the price index for the bundle of v=s and Xi = (S
Xvt)1/t as the quantity index. Since both the aggregate and the sub-utility function are CES-
functions, the analysis is exactly the same. For this reason, we skip the analysis and merely
present the results. The demand for Xi equals
P.)P(
Y
 = X -1c
i
i VV
(7)
where V = 1/(1-a) is the elasticity of substitution between any two bundles, Y is consumer in-
come and P is the consumer price index corresponding to U and defined by
( ))P( + )P(  = P -1ci-1cjJ 1j= )-/(11VV VS (8)
Using the fact that I = PicXi, the demand for each individual variety Xv becomes
or 
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where i = (P/Pic)V-1. The price elasticity of Xv with respect to Pvc is
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In case of symmetry, (Pic/Pvc)s-1 may be simplified to 1/N; i (Pic) = (P/Pic)V-1 equals the
propensity to consume. Below, we will merely replace (P/Pic)V-1 with i (Pic) if appropriate, but,
of course, this does not make i (Pic) independent from Pic.
Single product firms
Profits are maximized when marginal revenues MR equal marginal costs MC: MR = MC.
Marginal revenues may be written as a function of price Pv and the price elasticity of demand
e: MR = Pv[1+1/e]. Since we already derived the price elasticity of demand above [equation
(11)], we may now determine the profit maximizing prices. Downstream profits are maxi-
mized when
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where edd is given by equation (11). When we impose symmetry, (Pic/Pvc)s-1 may be simpli-
fied to (1/N). (P/Pic) V-1 is replaced by inc*, the equilibrium propensity to consume under non-
cooperation. This gives the following result
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The upstream price elasticity of derived demand equals
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where ep represents the price elasticity of the consumer price with respect to the wholesale
price. This elasticity equals
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where n = [(s-1)(N-1)+(V-1)(1- inc*)+N]/[(s-1)(N-1)+(V-1)(1-inc*)]. The upstream=s firm price
are maximized if marginal revenues equal marginal costs or
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Simplifying (Pic/Pvc)s-1 to (1/N) and substituting (P/Pic)V-1 for inc*, gives the following
result after some substitution
Resume - Oligopoly
Substituting equation (17) into equation (13) gives the consumer price as a function of the ex-
ogenous variables
)P+P+P( = P dpupuv2cv n (18)
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Consumer demand can be found by substituting equation (18) into equation (10)
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Note that (Pic)1-s = N(Pvc)1-s because of the symmetry assumption. Downstream profits
per variety Pvd = (Pvc-Pvd-Ppd)Xv are found using equations (17), (18) and (19)
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Upstream profits per variety Pvu = (Pvd-Pvu-Ppu)Xv are found using equations (17) and
(19)
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Aggregate profits per variety Pv = Pvd + Pvu = (Pvc-Pvu-Ppd-Ppu)Xv are found using
equations (20) and (21)
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Franchising - Oligopoly
The wholesale price Pvd under franchising equals
P+P = P upuvdv (23)
The consumer price is found by substituting equation (23) into equation (13)
)P+P+P( = P dpupuvcv n (24)
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Equilibrium demand is found by substituting equation (24) into equation (10)
Output under franchising exceeds output under non-cooperation since n2 > n, since n
> 1. Downstream (gross) profits per variety now are
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Upstream (gross) profits per variety are zero. Aggregate profits per variety thus are
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Aggregate profits under franchising exceed those under non-cooperation if
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There is no clear-cut analytical solution to this inequality.
Multiproduct firms
A n product firm maximizes its profits over all the n markets in which it sells. Its profits are
X)c-P(  = vvvn 1=vSP (29)
where cv denotes variety v=s per unit costs. Profits are maximized with respect to Pv if
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Subscript w refers to the other varieties sold by the multiproduct firm. The equation
should hold for all varieties v sold by the multiproduct firm. The equation may be simplified
to
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where ev denotes the price elasticity of Xv with respect to Pv and ew the cross price elasticity of
Xv with respect to Pw. For the downstream firm we then have
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where
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In case of symmetry, (Pic/Pvc)s-1 = 1/N, Xv = Xw, Pvc = Pwc and Pvd = Pwd. Imposing
symmetry and substituting inc* for (P/Pic)V-1 reduces equation (32) to
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The own and cross price elasticities of derived demand as faced upstream are
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where evu = evdep and ewu = ewdep. Substitution into the first order condition [equation (31)]
gives
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and after imposing symmetry
P1)-( + )P+P( = P dpupuvdv mm (39)
where m = [(s-1)(N-m)+m(V-1)(1-inc*)+N]/[(s-1)(N-m)+m(V-1)(1-inc*)].
Resume - Oligopoly
Substituting equation (39) into equation (35) gives the consumer price as a function of the ex-
ogenous variables
)P+P+P( = P dpupuvcv mn (40)
where m = [(s-1)(N-m)+m(V-1)(1-inc*)+N]/[(s-1)(N-m)+m(V-1)(1-inc*)] and n = [(s-1)(N-
37
n)+n(V-1)(1-inc*)+N]/[(s-1)(N-n)+n(V-1)(1- inc*)]. Consumer demand can be found by substi-
tuting equation (40) into equation (10)
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Downstream firm profits per variety are [equation (39), (40) and (41)]
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Upstream firm profits per variety are [equation (39) and (41)]
N
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Aggregate profits per variety are [equation (42) and (43)]
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Franchising - Oligopoly
The wholesale price under franchising equals
P+P = P upuvdv (48)
The consumer price is derived by substituting equation (45) into equation (35)
)P+P+P( = P dpupuvcv n (49)
Consumer demand and output are found by substituting equation (46) into equation (10)
N)P+P+P(
Y
 = X d
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n
(50)
Output under franchising exceeds output under non-cooperation because mn > n  - since
m > 1 - and if > inc since Mi/MP < 0. Aggregate profits follow from equation (46) and (47)
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Aggregate profits under franchising exceed those under non-cooperation if
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There is no clear-cut analytical solution to this inequality.
